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Ex parte communications'-off-the-record contacts between adminis-
trative agencies and parties to agency proceedings-are an important
element of the administrative process.2 Permitting ex parte contacts
in certain agency proceedings raises questions of fairness, however, be-
cause of the scope it allows for inaccuracy in agency fact-finding,
3
unequal access to agency decisionmakers,4 and improper political in-
fluence. 5 Recognizing these problems, Congress amended the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1976 to prohibit ex parte communi-
cations in formal rulemaking proceedings and in agency adjudications.6
The permissibility of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking is
an unsettled question, however. The issue has divided the District of
Columbia Circuit,7 and agency regulations still vary widely.3 This
1. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344,
5362, 7521 (1976) [hereinafter cited by section number only], defines an "ex parte com-
munication" as "an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect
to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given." § 551(14). The terms "ex
parte communication" and "ex parte contact" will be used interchangeably in this Note.
2. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1978) (informal contacts the "bread and butter" of administration); J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIrMACY 207 (1978) (over 80% of agency actions taken without
formal proceedings).
3. See, e.g., Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964) (no scrutiny by other parties of factual
accuracy of important ex parte contact).
4. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (public interest group excluded from critical meeting between industry repre-
sentatives and agency decisionmakers).
5. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978) (key members of Congress pressured agency at request of
interested parties).
6. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976)).
Ex parte contacts long have been prohibited in the course of agency adjudications.
See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966) (ex parte contact in
adjudicatory proceeding violates procedural due process); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters,
Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (secret attempts to influence FCC vitiate
licensing proceeding).
7. Compare Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1978) (contacts prohibited in all informal rulemaking proceedings) and
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(contacts prohibited in proceeding outside APA) with Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (contacts permitted in some informal rulemaking
proceedings).
8. Agency policies pertaining to ex parte contacts between interested parties and
agency decisionmakers fall into four categories: 1) complete prohibition, see, e.g., 16
Ex Parte Contacts
Note argues that due process requires stringent controls on ex parte
communications in informal rulemaking. The Note begins by argu-
ing that procedural due process should apply to informal rulemaking
in order to protect significant individual interests otherwise unpro-
tected by effective safeguards. The Note then examines what spe-
cific procedures are required by due process, and concludes that ex
parte contacts during the comment period should be banned, and any
subsequent contacts should be disclosed in the public record.9
I. Ex Parte Contacts and the APA
The APA provides two procedures by which agencies can promul-
gate "rules": 10 formal rulemaking and informal rulemaking. Agen-
cies use formal rulemaking, governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1976),
when Congress requires that rules be made "on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing."' 1 Formal rulemaking proceedings or-
dinarily involve an oral hearing, with cross-examination and rebuttal
C.F.R. § 1.18(c) (1979) (Federal Trade Commission); 2) partial prohibition, with specified
exceptions, see, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 300.2 (1979) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 3) comprehensive
disclosure, see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 1012.1-.8 (1979) (Consumer Product Safety Commission);
4) no restrictions, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.110-114 (1978) (Securities and Exchange
Commission). See generally Hager, Agencies Struggle to Define Ex-Parte Rules, Legal
Times, July 24, 1978, at 1, col. 2; Ringel, "Ex Parte" Contact Becomes Hot Issue, Legal
Times, Jan. 29, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
9. This Note considers only ex parte contacts between federal agency decisionmakers
and outside parties. Different considerations are involved in deciding whether such con-
tacts should be permitted between agency decisionmakers and agency staff, see Hercules,
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 124-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (dictum), or between agency decision-
makers and other Executive branch officials, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Schultze, No. 79-0153 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 1979). For discussions of these questions, see
Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 500-06 (1979);
Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative Agencies,
76 HARv. L. REv. 233, 256-62 (1962).
10. A rule is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976). Although authorities generally agree that the phrase "general
or particular applicability" should not be construed as sanctioning adjudication through
rulemaking, see, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINiSTRATIvE LAWv TEXT 125 (3d ed. 1972), courts have
permitted agencies to promulgate rules which, though general in form, affect only one
or a few parties. See note 63 infra.
11. Section 553(c). Interpretation of this APA provision has proven difficult. The
Supreme Court has stated that statutory language besides the phrase "on the record"
could trigger formal rulemaking requirements. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973). However, in the view of many courts, see, e.g., Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and commentators, see, e.g., Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1306-07 (1975), other Supreme Court
decisions effectively require Congress to specify formal rulemaking in those terms.
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by the parties.12 In contrast, informal rulemaking proceedings, gov-
erned by section 553, are relatively simple: the agency must publish
notice of the proposed rulemaking;13 interested parties must be given
the opportunity to submit written comments; 14 and the final rule,
when published, must include a brief statement of reasons.15
Congress usually specifies the decisionmaking procedure that an
agency is to follow in a given area. 6 In the absence of a congres-
sional directive, however, an agency seeking to promulgate rules need
only follow section 553 procedures.' 7 Informal rulemaking is em-
ployed for a vast range of agency decisionmaking, from the very
12. Section 556(d). The agency may forgo an oral hearing and require that all or
part of the evidence be submitted in written form "when a party will not be prejudiced
thereby." Id.
13. Section 553(b)(3) (notice of proposed rulemaking must be published in Federal
Register and include "terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved").
14. Section 553(c).
15. Id.
16. See Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed
Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1751 n.5 (1975). There are two modes of agency decision-
making besides formal and informal rulemaking: adjudication, and informal agency
action, a residual category of decisionmaking not covered by the APA. Id.
It is often difficult to determine whether or not an agency proceeding is "informal
rulemaking." See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973)
("idle, and fruitless, to boggle over the appropriate classification"). This Note assumes
that agencies are engaged in informal rulemaking if the rulemaking is not required by
statute to be "on the record" and Congress has not required special procedures beyond
those set out in § 553.
17. In several specified areas, rulemaking is exempted from § 553 requirements: mili-
tary or foreign policy functions; agency management matters; and matters pertaining to
public property, loans, grants, benefits, and contracts. § 553(a). In addition, interpretative
rules, general policy statements, and rules of agency procedure are exempted. § 553(b)(A).
The agency can also forgo § 553 procedures when it finds for good cause that the pro-
cedure is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." § 553(b)(B).
Beyond these exceptions, exemption from § 553 requirements is allowed only if there is
evidence that Congress intended the exemption. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 656 (D.D.C. 1978).
Once the agency has met the minimal requirements set out in § 553, and procedural
due process has been satisfied, the agency can in its discretion provide additional pro-
cedures. The courts, however, are not permitted to mandate them. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542-47
(1978); cf. Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 382-84 (1974) (criticizing previous decisions mandating
procedural requirements).
When Congress has not specified the mode of agency decisionmaking, agencies can
choose whether to use adjudication or rulemaking to formulate general policy. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (choice between
rulemaking and adjudication is within NLRB's discretion); Robinson, The Making of
Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administra-
tive Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 508 (1970) (judicial limits on agency




specific, as in the allocation of a single television frequency between
two geographic areas,18 to the more general, as in the setting of emis-
sion standards for an industry.19
In 1976, Congress amended the APA to prohibit ex parte com-
munications in formal rulemaking proceedings and in agency ad-
judications, 20 and to require disclosure of prohibited contacts that
might occur despite the ban. 21 Congress failed to ban such contacts
in informal rulemaking,22 though it has indicated deep concern over
the fairness of rulemaking under section 553.23 As in formal rule-
18. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
19. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
20. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976)). The APA as enacted, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), dealt with
ex parte contacts only in the context of adjudications. The law prohibited hearing of-
ficers from consulting "any person or party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate." Id. (codified at § 554(d)(1)).
The 1976 amendment prohibits interested parties and agency decisionmakers from ini-
tiating ex parte communications relevant to the merits. § 557(d)(1)(A)-(B). The prohi-
bition takes effect at such time as the agency designates, but no later than when notice
of the proposed rulemaking issues. If an ex parte communication is made prior to, but
in anticipation of, notice, the prohibition is deemed to have taken effect when the ini-
tiating party learned of the proposed rulemaking. § 557(d)(1)(E).
21. Section 557(d). The agency employee involved in the prohibited contact is required
to place in the public file a memorandum setting out the substance of the communica-
tion and the response given, and copies of any written communications and responses.
§ 557(d)(1)(C). Upon receipt of a communication "knowingly made or knowingly caused
to be made" in violation of the prohibition, the agency or the administrative law judge
may require the party to show why his claim or his interest in the proceeding should
not be "dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected." § 557(d)(1)(D).
22. Two proposals to regulate ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking proceedings
died in committee. See S.260, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Hearings on S.260,
before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations of
the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 311-38 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as S.260 Hearings]; Open Communications Act of 1975, S.1289, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Hearings on the Open Communications Act of 1975, S.1289,
before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S.1289 Hearings].
Although the Administration's administrative reform bill currently before Congress,
S.755, does not address the problem of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, the
bill introduced by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Kennedy, does.
See S.1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S7128 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). The
bill would require agency decisionmakers to make a record of all communications ini-
tiated by outside parties after notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued with respect
to a rule that has an annual economic impact of $100 million or more. 125 CONG. REc.
S7129 (daily ed. June 6, 1979).
23. Most statutes passed by Congress between 1962 and 1972 that authorized agency
rulemaking required additional procedures beyond the § 553 requirements. See Hamilton,
Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1314-15 (1972). This
trend toward "hybrid rulemaking" reflects congressional dissatisfaction with the fairness
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making,24 however, permitting ex parte contacts in informal rule-
making involves severe costs to fairness and accuracy.
A simple hypothetical may illustrate this point.25 Suppose that an
agency gives notice of proposed rulemaking to regulate television
advertising. Among the interested parties are the broadcasters and a
public interest group. Both groups submit written comments during
the public comment period. After the close of the comment period,
however, the broadcasters send the agency new data that supports
their position. Shortly thereafter, they have a closed-door meeting
with agency decisionmakers, after which key senators privately con-
tact the agency and threaten to cut the agency's appropriations unless
the broadcasters' position is adopted in the agency's new rule. The
public interest group, unaware of the broadcasters' contacts with the
agency, neither seeks nor is offered access to the decisionmakers after
the public comment period. Permitting ex parte contacts in this pro-
ceeding has clear disadvantages. First, the accuracy of the fact-finding
process may suffer in that the agency has not had the benefit of other
parties' scrutiny of the arguments and the data submitted by the
broadcasters after the close of the comment period. Second, the fair-
ness of the proceeding is compromised because the broadcasters were
given a special hearing not accorded the other parties. Finally, the
secret political intervention may interfere with the agency's ability
to make a reasoned decision based on the statutory criteria.
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit dramatically revised the law on the ex parte issue. In an earlier
decision, the court had held that "basic fairness" required prohibi-
tion of ex parte communications in informal rulemaking proceed-
ings involving "resolution of conflicting private claims to a valuable
privilege."26 The court extended that ruling in Home Box Office,
of § 553 procedures. See, e.g., Hearings on APA Amendments of 1976, before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice e- Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1976) (testimony of Federal Bar Association representative)
(additional procedures imposed because Congress regards § 553 inadequate to protect
public interest); 119 CONG. REC. 40,429 (1973) (Sen. Mathias) (amendment giving parties
right of cross-examination in certain FTC rulemaking proceedings characterized as "due
process amendment," "to assure a fair ... consideration" of issues).
24. The purpose of prohibiting ex parte contacts was to "ensure both fairness and
soundness" in formal rulemaking proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 880 (PART II), 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2212, 2227.
25. This hypothetical draws on two recent cases, Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
26. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
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Inc. v. FCC,27 holding that ex parte communications between in-
terested parties and agency decisionmakers were impermissible in all
informal rulemaking proceedings.2 8 One important rationale for the
holding was "the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions
of fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned
decisionmaking on the merits.120
The Home Box Office rule subsequently was criticized by another
panel of the District of Columbia Circuit in Action for Children's
Television v. FCC.30 The panel concluded that permitting ex parte
contacts in certain section 553 proceedings did not raise "serious ques-
tions of fairness," 3 ' and declined to apply the Home Box Office pro-
hibition. The panel did not, however, overrule Home Box Office,32
nor have subsequent cases.33
This line of cases recognized the due process implications of ex
parte communications in informal rulemaking. Yet none of the cases
applies a systematic due process analysis.3 4 Under such an analysis, a
27. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
28. Id. at 57. The court framed a general rule:
Once a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued, . . . any agency official or
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process of the rulemaking proceeding, should 'refus[e] to discuss matters relating to
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested private party, or
an attorney or agent for such party, prior to the [agency's] decision' . ...
Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 11,920, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 121, 123 (1977)) (prohibiting ex parte
contacts with White House staff in connection with Presidential approval of international
air route allocation). The court held that communications received prior to issue of the
notice of rulemaking that are relevant to the merits of the proceeding need not be re-
ported unless they are the basis for subsequent agency action. Id. Any ex parte com-
munications received after the notice has been issued must be summarized in writing
and placed in the public record for comment by other interested parties. Id.
29. Id. at 56.
30. 564 F.2d 458, 474-78 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
31. Id. at 477.
32. Id. at 474. The panel held only that the prohibition should not be applied retro-
actively since it "constitutes a clear departure from established law." Id.
33. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (relying on Home Box Office as basis for prohibiting ex parte contacts in
agency proceeding outside APA); National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. ICC, 590
F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (prohibiting ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking conducted
pursuant to statutory hearing requirement).
34. Both Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 56-57, and Action for Children's Television,
564 F.2d at 474-77, analyze the due process issue in terms of the rule of Sangamon Valley
Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 915 (1964). Although the panel in Action for Children's Television does briefly
discuss balancing of interests, it offers no explanation for its conclusion that the balance
should tip against the prohibition announced in Home Box Office. See 564 F.2d at 477.
In United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir.
1978), the court prohibited ex parte contacts on the ground that the public has a right
"to participate meaningfully in the decisionmaking process." Id. at 540. While there are
compelling reasons for recognizing such a right, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS-
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court must begin by determining whether due process applies to in-
formal rulemaking. If due process applies, the court then must deter-
mine whether ex parte contacts are consistent with the requirements
of due process. Such an analysis suggests that ex parte contacts in
informal rulemaking should be severely restricted.
II. Procedural Due Process and Informal Rulemaking
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has proceeded case-by-
case in determining whether due process applies to various functions
of administrative agencies, and in determining the specific process
required. 35 The due process analysis that has emerged should be the
point of departure for any examination of the permissibility of ex
parte contacts in informal rulemaking.
A. Two Approaches to Procedural Due Process
The Supreme Court has adopted two apparently different approach-
es to due process in the agency setting, without clarifying the rela-
tionship between the two. The approach used most frequently by
the Court is the two-step analysis of Goldberg v. Kelly.36 The first
step under the Goldberg analysis is to determine whether process is
due in agency decisionmaking, according to whether liberty or prop-
erty interests are involved.37 Once it is established that process is
due, the next step is to balance the interests of the individual against
the interests of the government 8 in order to determine whether pro-
TUTIONAL LAW 502-05 (1978); Wright, suPra note 17, at 379-81, 387 n.59, there are nar-
rower grounds on which restrictions on ex parte contacts can be justified. Moreover, a
restriction less drastic than complete prohibition may satisfy the requirements of due
process. See p. 209 infra.
35. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (hearing required prior to
parole revocation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (no hearing required
prior to termination of disability benefits).
36. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. 397 U.S. at 262. In Goldberg, termination of public assistance benefits was held
to constitute deprivation of a property entitlement. Id. This test has since been applied
repeatedly. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (suspension from public
school constitutes deprivation of entitlement); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
578 (1972) (dismissal from nontenured position not deprivation of property interest).
38. 397 U.S. at 263-66. In Goldberg, the recipient's interest in avoiding erroneous
termination of benefits was held to outweigh the government interest in summary ad-
judication. Id. Use of a balancing test is a standard feature of recent due process cases.
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977) (costs of additional adminis-
trative procedures outweigh likely reduction in risk of error); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976) (costs of pre-termination evidentiary hearing in disability benefits
program outweigh probable improvement in accuracy).
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cedures currently in use afford the individual's interests adequate
protection.3 9
In the rulemaking context, however, the Court has taken a dif-
ferent approach. The leading case, United States v. Florida East Coast
Railway,40 addressed the question whether an agency's use of section
553 procedures in setting "incentive charges" satisfied due process. 41
The Court judged the agency function to be "legislative" rather than
"adjudicative" in nature, 42 and held that consequently due process
did not require an oral hearing.43
Goldberg and Florida East Coast Railway apply two different ap-
proaches to the threshold question whether process is due.4 4 Since
the Court failed to explain why it applied a different threshold test
39. 397 U.S. at 263-66. In Goldberg, the Court held that the absence of an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits exposed the recipient to undue risk. Id.
Under the balancing test, existing procedures are generally used as the standard of com-
parison. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (available common law
remedies adequately protect student's liberty interests implicated in corporal punishment);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1975) (existing procedures inadequate to protect
liberty and property interests of suspended students).
40. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
41. 410 U.S. at 238. The case arose under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(14)(a) (1970), which provides, "The Commission may, after hearing, . . . establish
reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by common carriers
by railroad . . . including the compensation to be paid .... ." Before reaching the
constitutional issue, the Court concluded that the statutory language did not mandate
formal rulemaking procedures. Id.
42. 410 U.S. at 245-46. The Court described the legislative-adjudicative dichotomy as
"a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of
promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed
to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other." Id. at 245. Many com-
mentators have noted the difficulties with this distinction. See, e.g., Friendly, supra
note 11, at 1309-10; Robinson, supra note 17, at 503-04; Nathanson, Book Review, 70
YALE LJ. 1210, 1211-12 (1961).
43. 410 U.S. at 245. The Court relied on Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (Holmes, J.), for the proposition that due process does not
require an oral hearing in agency rulemaking of a legislative character. In Bi-Metallic, a
taxpayer argued that due process required a state agency to hold an oral hearing before
increasing uniformly the assessment of all taxable property in Denver. The Court held
there was no constitutional right to a hearing because "[w]here a rule of conduct ap-
plies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct
voice in its adoption." Id. at 445.
The Court had previously held, in Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908),
that due process required a city council to hold an oral hearing before assessing shares
of the cost of local improvements to property-owners on the basis of relative benefit. In
Bi-Metallic, the Court distinguished Londoner on the ground that the assessment chal-
lenged in the earlier case concerned "[a] relatively small number of persons . . . excep-
tionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds." 239 U.S. at 446.
44. The Court fails to make clear in Florida East Coast Railway whether the legis-
lative-adjudicative classification test is used to determine whether due process requires
an oral hearing, or merely whether due process applies. The latter reading is adopted for
the analysis in this Note.
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to rulemaking than to other agency functions, it is important to ex-
plore the underlying rationale for the threshold inquiry in order to
decide which test to apply to informal rulemaking. The function of
the threshold inquiry should be to answer two questions: whether
there are individual interests at stake that warrant protection, and
whether procedure is an appropriate means of protecting them. Of
the two threshold tests, that of Florida East Coast Railway better
serves this function. The Florida East Coast Railway approach in-
volves classifying agency action as legislative or adjudicative, which
requires examining both the individual interests at stake and the non-
procedural safeguards protecting them.45 The first step of the Gold-
berg analysis, the alternative threshold test, considers only the na-
ture of the relevant individual interests. Thus the Florida East Coast
Railway test implicitly addresses both of the threshold issues, the im-
portance of the interests and the need for procedural protection,
whereas Goldberg addresses only the former.
Although Florida East Coast Railway uses the preferred threshold
test, the decision gives no guidance in determining the procedures
required once due process is found to apply. The second step of the
Goldberg analysis, balancing of interests, should be used in making
that determination. Balancing interests is appropriate because it al-
lows the procedural requirements to be tailored to the particular
circumstances. 46
B. The Threshold Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking
The essential feature of the Florida East Coast Railway test is the
classification of an agency action as legislative or adjudicative in or-
der to determine whether due process applies. Under the test, due
process does not apply to legislative agency actions. This approach
is grounded on the premise that procedural due process is required
in adjudication, but not in legislation. Although laws must meet a
minimum standard of rationality in order to satisfy the requirements
of substantive due process, 47 the Supreme Court has refused to hold
45. See pp. 203-04 infra (analysis of legislation-adjudication distinction).
46. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). In a classic formulation,
Justice Frankfurter wrote, "'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances . J..." joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). There are, however, limits on the appropriate use of balancing. See Note,
SPecifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest
Balancing, 88 HARV. L. RaV. 1510, 1523-27 (1975) (exclusive reliance on balancing under-
cuts individual's constitutional protection against government's power).
47. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (law must bear
rational relation to its objective).
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that the Constitution requires any procedural "due process of law-
making." 48 In adjudication, on the other hand, judges are required
to apply rules and principles relevant to resolution of the dispute at
hand,49 and must conform to codified procedural norms.50
Before the Florida East Coast Railway test can be applied to in-
formal rulemaking, it is necessary to consider the reasons why pro-
cedural due process applies to the judicial process but not to the
legislative process.
1. Due Process and the Adjudication-Legislation Distinction
According to the traditional paradigms, courts resolve individual
conflicts between particularized interests, whereas legislatures formu-
late policies of general applicability. No simple characterization of
the individual interests at stake in the legislative and judicial pro-
cesses as "generalized" or "particularized" is possible, however. For
example, class suits implicate the common interests of groups,5' whereas
a private bill typically affects only one individual directly. 52 There is,
however, one critical difference between the interests at stake in legisla-
tion and adjudication: an individual can be singled out for a penalty
in adjudication, a possibility foreclosed in the legislative process.5 3
Differences between the legislative and judicial processes with re-
gard to the extent of political control and the nature of the fact-
finding reflect the different means by which individual interests are
protected. Popular elections provide a means of holding legislators
48. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 242-43 (1976); see Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (validity of law not affected
by means that procured passage).
49. See B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20, 149-58 (1921). Many
scholars have noted, however, that judges, particularly Supreme Court justices, "legislate"
on occasion. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, supra at 103-41; Hazard, The Supreme Court as a
Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1978).
50. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P.; FED. R. EVID.
51. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (class suit brought on
behalf of all patients involuntarily confined in state mental institutions); Pugh v. Locke,
406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd in Part and rev'd in part sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), modified in part per curiam sub nom. Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) (inmates in state prison system).
52. E.g., Priv. L. No. 5, 89 Stat. 1167 (1975) (discharging individual of liability for
debt to United States); Priv. L. No. 14, 89 Stat. 1176 (1975) (removing statute of limi-
tations bar to an application for death benefits).
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting bills of attainder). The
courts have construed this prohibition broadly with regard to penalization of individuals
by the legislature. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965) (prohibition
bars legislative punishment of specifically designated persons or groups); United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (prohibition bars legislative acts that inflict punish-
ment without trial on ascertainable members of a group).
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accountable and give politicians a strong incentive to respond to
constituent demands. 54 This check does not exist for federal judges,
who are virtually assured of job security and undiminished salary.
Freedom from political control is vital to the judiciary's effective
performance of its constitutional function.50 In the absence of a di-
rect political check, however, due process serves to restrain the judiciary.
Fact-finding in the legislative and judicial processes also differs
markedly. In adjudication, facts must be found by the jury, or, in
the absence of a jury, by the judge.57 There is, however, no fact-
finding requirement for legislatures. 58 Judicial fact-finding, unlike
legislative fact-finding, has binding future effect.59 Due process is
applied in adjudication to help ensure the accuracy of judicial de-
terminations of fact.
2. Due Process and Informal Rulemaking
Although informal rulemaking has elements in common with both
legislation and adjudication, it should be classified as adjudicative
for purposes of due process analysis. The individual interests at stake
and the inadequacy of "external" safeguards dictate that due process
apply to informal rulemaking.
Participants in informal rulemaking proceedings have both eco-
nomic and noneconomic interests at stake.60 Rulemaking of general
54. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-19 (1974). But cf.
J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 261-64 (4th ed. 1954) (voting be-
havior irrational).
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
56. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 197-98 (1962) (system includes
mechanisms for insulating judges from politics); TIE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton),
at 465-69 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (tenure during good behavior essential to judiciary's
independence, to allow it to withstand "legislative encroachments").
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
58. See Hazard, Representation in Rulemaking, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 97
(M. Schwartz ed. 1976). The kind of facts that a legislature finds differs from the kind
of facts that a court finds; "legislative facts" are typically general and forward-looking,
and cannot be conclusively determined. See K. DAvIs, supra note 10, at §§ 7.03, 15.03.
Legislative fact-finding is often perfunctory. See M. JEWELL & S. PATrERSON, THE LEcIS-
LATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 417 (1977).
59. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 563-69 (2d ed. 1977) (collateral estoppel).
60. The fact that Congress has provided certain minimal procedures that agencies
must observe in rulemaking suggests that these individual interests warrant procedural
protection under the due process doctrine, though obviously it does not settle the ques-
tion. Much informal rulemaking involves regulation of private economic activity, and
such regulation traditionally has triggered the requirements of due process. See, e.g.,
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525-29 (1934). Even an applicant for a benefit has a
property interest in the benefit if eligibility rules have been established. See Goldsmith v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926). Courts have invoked the due process
doctrine in cases involving agency allocations, even though no property interest, narrowly
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applicability, like legislation, often confers benefits or penalties of
an economic nature on a large class of parties."' In addition to eco-
nomic interests, participants have a dignity interest in the proceed-
ings, which includes an interest in "equality of opportunity to be
heard."' 2 Some rulemaking, though general in form, imposes bur-
dens on one or a few unnamed parties, or deprives them of benefits
previously conferred.63 As in an adjudication, the possibility exists
that agency rulemaking will single out selected parties for severe eco-
nomic losses.
The other point to be considered in deciding whether due process
applies is the adequacy of the external, nonprocedural safeguards pro-
tecting individual interests. Political control over agency rulemaking
is inadequate to protect those interests. Agency decisionmakers are
appointed rather than elected, 64 and thus there is no direct political
recourse.03 Although agencies are subject to some measure of congres-
sionalo and presidential 67 control, such intervention is often cum-
defined, was involved. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d
221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964) (proceeding to allocate television
frequency between geographic areas). This suggests that the applicability of the due process
doctrine should not be made dependent on "assignment of meaning to the word 'prop-
erty.'" United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1062 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 935 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 18 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978) (regulations for cable broadcasters).
62. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudica-
tion in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 28, 52 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pollution stan-
dards directed at single domestic manufacturer of toxic substance); Anaconda Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973) (pollution standards directed at single
unnamed company). The Supreme Court has not applied the prohibition against bills
of attainder to agency rulemaking. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 499-500.
64. See Sinaiko, Due Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 886, 893 (1975). Political accountability is reduced further by merit
selection of agency staff below the top bureaucratic level. Id.
65. See Comment, Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rule Making, 27 EmoRy L.J. 293, 317
(1978) (recognizing absence of political recourse but classifying informal rulemaking
"legislative").
66. The two major channels of congressional influence are the appropriations process
and oversight hearings. See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 30-45 (1967).
Congress also can exercise control over rulemaking through its power to restructure
agencies and alter the scope of their statutory authority. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE,
ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 109-27 (1974). In addition, the Senate must approve presidential
appointments to the independent agencies and to certain Executive branch positions. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Congress's dissatisfaction with its lack of control over rulemaking has in part given
rise to the current vogue of the legislative veto. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional
Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 H.Rv. L. REv.
1369, 1381-82 (1977).
67. The President appoints "purely executive officers" and members of the indepen-
dent agencies, though his removal power is limited to the former. See Humphrey's
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bersome and ineffective in safeguarding individual interests.08
Judicial review of informal rulemaking also fails to provide an
adequate safeguard. Agencies make rules pursuant to statutes. The
courts have done little, however, to ensure that Congress will pro-
vide clear operational guidelines for rulemaking.69 Thus agencies often
make rules with little statutory guidance. The standard of judicial
review for informal rulemaking 0 is no stricter than the standard
applied in review of legislation.71 Moreover, the Supreme Court re-
cently moved toward more restrained judicial scrutiny of agency
decisions."2
In the agency rulemaking process, as in the judicial process, no
external checks adequately protect the individual interests at stake.
Consequently, due process should apply to informal rulemaking.
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Through the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the President controls the budgetary requests of the Executive depart-
ments and of most independent agencies. See W. CARiY, supra note 66, at 6-8. For a rare
exception, see 15 U.S.C. § 2076(k) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission ex-
empted from prior OMB review). Similarly, OMB screens agencies' legislative recom-
mendations. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, supra note 66, at 135-36. With few exceptions,
the Attorney General decides whether an agency will appeal an adverse lower court
decision to the Supreme Court. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 64. See generally
Bruff, supra note 9.
68. See, e.g., Sinaiko, supra note 64, at 913; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. Rav. 401,
405 (1975). The public generally becomes aware of an agency proceeding only when the
final result is announced. See Sinaiko, supra note 64, at 895. On occasion, agencies have
been forced to withdraw regulations as the result of political pressure. Such instances
are rare, however, and have usually involved regulations affecting a large segment of
the population. See Williams, supra.
69. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737, 757 (D.D.C. 1971) (delegation held constitutional on basis of implied "broad equity
standard" in Act).
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976) (court shall hold unlawful any agency action, findings,
or conclusions found to be "arbitrary" or "capricious"). Although the Supreme Court
has not specified the appropriate standard of review, it tacitly approved the Court of
Appeals' use of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
In the past, there has been considerable uncertainty among commentators as to the
appropriate standard of review for informal rulemaking. See, e.g., Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 212-14 (1974); Note, supra note
16, at 1756 (1975).
71. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard has been equated with the "rational
basis" test applied to legislation. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Verkuil, supra note 70, at 206-07. But cf.
Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir.
1973) (dictum) ("arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards are
equivalent in practice).
72. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 485 U.S. 519, 545-49 (1978).
206
Ex Parte Contacts
III. Ex Parte Contacts and the Requirements of Due Process
Once it is established that due process applies to informal rule-
making, an interest-balancing test, derived from Goldberg v. Kelly,7 3
is appropriate for determining whether ex parte contacts are com-
patible with the requirements of due process.
A. Determining the Process Due
The Supreme Court's test for determining the process due in an
agency action weighs the governmental interests in efficiency and
economy against three countervailing factors: the magnitude of the
private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that in-
terest, and the probable value of additional safeguards.74 The gov-
ernment's effectiveness and efficiency may be undercut by imposing
additional procedural requirements. In order to avoid this result,
the due process determination takes into account the government's
interests in "conserving fiscal and administrative resources," 75 and
in maintaining flexibility to respond rapidly to changing circum-
stances.76
Rather than evaluating agency procedures in isolation, the balanc-
ing approach considers alternative procedures, and assesses whether
due process requires their adoption. 77 In order to determine whether
ex parte communications in informal rulemaking violate due process,
it therefore is necessary to examine the alternatives to the policy of
unrestricted contacts.
B. Restricting Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rulemaking
Permitting ex parte communications in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings benefits the agency because it allows easy access to infor-
mation relevant to the proceeding. 8 In the event that an agency dis-
73. 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
74. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In applying this test, the Court
has equated the individual's financial interest with the "private interest" at stake. See id.
at 340-43. Thus the individual's dignity interest is not taken into account in the balanc-
ing. See Mashaw, supra note 62, at 51.
75. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
76. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939) (flexibility, swiftness in
meeting emergencies are among most valuable qualities of administrative process).
77. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-48 (1976); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977).
78. See K. DAvis, supra note 10, at 142. Davis defends ex parte contacts in informal
rulemaking as the "principal channel" of "democratic influences on administration," id.
at 268, without explaining why the public comment procedure alone would not serve
as well.
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covers that it needs information not submitted during the comment
period, it can gather that information quickly from the parties.
Permitting unrestricted ex parte contacts involves three major costs:
potential inaccuracy in agency fact-finding; 9 possible unfairness in
giving certain interested parties special access to decisionmakers;80
and the risk of improper political influence.8 ' These costs must be
measured against the cost of restricting ex parte contacts. If the bene-
fits of restriction outweigh the burden involved, then due process re-
quires that contacts be restricted.8 2
There are two alternatives to permitting unrestricted ex parte con-
tacts: complete prohibition8 3 and limited restriction. Both alterna-
tives would force parties to state their positions fully during the
public comment period. However, complete prohibition of contacts
might chill discussions between the agency and parties with whom
the agency must consult frequently on a wide range of matters.8 4 The
deterrent effect of the prohibition might be greater than intended
and could result in overreliance on agency staff.8 5
79. Public comment on submissions helps ensure a correct and full presentation of
the facts. See, e.g., Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communi-
cations in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L REv. 377, 398 (1978); Note, Ex
Parte Contacts with the Federal Communications Commission, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1178,
1183 (1960).
Nathanson contends, however, that factual arguments made in ex parte contacts are
rarely of critical importance. Nathanson, supra, at 598. For a counterexample, see San-
gamon- Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964) (factual argument in ex parte communication was decisive).
80. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (public interest group excluded from final closed-door session between FCC chairman
and industry officials); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978) (after close of comment period, agency staff met with
broadcast interests 18 times but never met with public interest intervenors). The risk
of unfairness is particularly troublesome in light of the widespread view that many
agencies are captive to interests they regulate, see, e.g., R. NOLL, REFORNIING RFGULATION
41 (1971), and thus are vulnerable to ex parte pressures.
81. See, e.g., S.1289 Hearings, supra note 22, at 100-03 (testimony of former FCC
general counsel) (barring ex parte contacts inhibits "improper" congressional pressure);
S.260 Hearings, supra note 22, at 44-45 (testimony of Rep. Fascell) (making record of
contacts eliminates hidden exercise of political influence). But cf. Peck, supra note 9,
at 262-66 (politicians' desire for publicity limits secret intervention).
82. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
83. Ex parte contacts are almost always prohibited in judicial proceedings, to ensure
that judges base findings of fact on adversary proceedings, and to insulate judges from
external influence or pressure. See ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4) (1972).
Even in judicial proceedings, however, ex parte communications are permitted under
certain circumstances. See FD. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (application for temporary restraining
order). But cf. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181-83
(1968) (ex parte order invalid if no attempt made to notify adverse party).
84. See S.1289 Hearings, supra note 22, at 179 (testimony of National Association of
Manufacturers representative) (ban on ex parte contacts would hinder free flow of in-
formation between agencies and business).
85. See Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 229 (1978).
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If ex parte contacts are restricted rather than prohibited entirely,
they should be permitted only when three conditions are met: the
public comment period is closed; good cause is shown; and the sub-
stance of the communications is subsequently entered in the public
record, or "logged."8 6 This restricted-contact alternative has many of
the advantages of a complete prohibition and few of its shortcomings.
The purpose of the first restriction is to ensure that the public
comment procedure is used when it is available. If interested parties
know that they can present their cases in private to agency decision-
makers following the comment period, they are unlikely to disclose
their positions fully in the public proceeding.8 7
The aim of the "good cause" requirement is to reduce the pos-
sibility of unfairness in the agency's determination of who will be
permitted to make late submissions. To show "good cause," a party
would have to prove that the information it wished to submit was
previously unavailable.88
The third restriction, the logging requirement, would eliminate
the appearance of impropriety in the agency's discussions with inter-
ested parties following the comment period. Logging would enable
courts to review agency decisions on the basis of all the information
available to the decisionmakers,8 9 and would lessen the risk of un-
86. This proposal substantially resembles the rule framed by the court in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978),
see note 28 supra, except that it permits contacts following the close of the comment
period on a showing of good cause, provided the contacts are logged.
87. See Speech by FCC Chairman Richard Wiley to the Federal Communications Bar
Association (April 30, 1974), reprinted in Part in S.1289 Hearings, supra note 22, at 100.
88. "Good cause" might be established when conditions change after a delay in the
agency's promulgation of a rule, or when new data become available to the parties.
A party's dilatoriness in gathering data should not, however, be a sufficient ground
for permitting late submissions.
89. The District of Columbia Circuit held in both Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978), and United States
Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1978), that ex
parte contacts in informal rulemaking frustrate judicial review. However, the Supreme
Court by implication has rejected the argument that courts can require agencies to em-
ploy additional procedures in order to ensure effective judicial review. See Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
547 (1978). The Court held, "[Tlhe adequacy of the 'record' in [informal rulemaking] is
not correlated directly to the type of procedural devices employed, but rather turns on
whether the agency has followed the statutory mandate of the Administrative Procedure
Act or other relevant statutes." Id. at 547.
The Court in United States Lines reconciled its holding with Vermont Yankee on
the ground that the Supreme Court could not have intended to allow agencies to fore-
close judicial review where there is statutory provision for such review. 584 F.2d at 542
n.63. Although one commentator has endorsed this reading of Vermont Yankee, see
Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1804, 1816 n.49 (1978), that interpretation runs counter to the Court's argument.
An objection could be raised to a judicially-imposed logging requirement on the basis
of dictum in Vermont Yankee implying that nothing beyond § 553 procedures is neces-
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disclosed political influence in agency decisionmaking. It would not
prevent a member of Congress from expressing his views on a pro-
posed rule, but would require that his comments be on the record,
along with the other comments received.
The benefits resulting from these restrictions would outweigh the
costs. The logging requirement admittedly creates an administrative
burden, but one agency that currently requires contacts to be logged
has found the burden not to be greatY0 Moreover, the agency has found
that logging has had a minimal chilling effect on agency discussions
with interested parties.91 Although agencies will incur some costs in
making "good cause" determinations and in the ensuing litigation,
those costs will be partially offset by a reduction in the current volume
of litigation challenging rules because of ex parte contacts in the
proceedings.92
To enable agencies to implement these restrictions, Congress should
establish civil penalties for violations by agency staff or interested
parties.93 As part of each rulemaking proceeding, agencies should be
required to designate a staff member to make "good cause" rulings
on late submissions. If a party contacts the agency after the agency
has begun to contemplate rulemaking on an issue, but before the
notice of rulemaking has been issued, the contact should be logged.
9 4
sary to satisfy the requirements of due process in some informal rulemaking proceedings.
435 U.S. at 542 n.16. The case did not involve the issue of ex parte contacts, however,
and many commentators have argued that the opinion should be read narrowly. See, e.g.,
K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 6.36 (2d ed. 1978); Stewart, supra, at 1821.
90. See S.1289 Hearings, suPra note 22, at 17 (testimony of Richard Simpson, Chairman,
Consumer Product Safety Commission) (no major burden associated with logging). But
ef. S.260 Hearings, supra note 22, at 198 (testimony of George Stafford, Chairman, In-
terstate Commerce Commission) (considerable expense anticipated).
91. See S.1289 Hearings, supra note 22, at 171-72 (testimony of Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers Association representative) (no chilling effect felt as result of logging at Food
and Drug Administration).
92. If the District of Columbia Circuit retreats from the ban announced in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978),
parties are likely to test the limits of any partial restriction, such as the one set out
in Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964), where the court held that ex parte contacts
were prohibited in proceedings involving "resolution of conflicting private claims to a
valuable privilege."
93. See, e.g., Peck, suPra note 9, at 271-73 (recommending disqualification of party in
allocation proceedings); Note, supra note 79, at 1194-96, 1199 (recommending fine of up
to $10,000); cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, ?22 (1975) (§ 1983 liability for agency
officials who "knew or reasonably should have known" that their official action violated
others' constitutional rights).
94. One of Nathanson's major objections to such a restriction is that the agency is
likely to circumvent it by holding extensive discussions with outside parties before issuing
the notice of rulemaking. Nathanson, supra note 79, at 403. This difficulty can be avoided
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Once the notice has been issued, all ex parte contacts should be
logged. The initiating party also should be required to show why
his claim should not be adversely affected by his violation of the re-
strictions on ex parte contacts. 95
If judicial review of agency rulemaking discloses that ex parte con-
tacts have not been logged in a proceeding, the court should remand
the record to the agency for specification of the source and content
of all contacts.9" Other parties should be given the opportunity to
respond to the ex parte contacts. This remedy is preferable to that of
vacating the proceedings, because the latter remedy merely sends the
decision back to the same decisionmakers. 97
Restricting ex parte contacts protects individual interests at a cost
that is not prohibitive. It improves the fairness of informal rulemak-
ing while preserving its flexibility.98 Because the benefits outweigh
the costs, due process requires that ex parte contacts be restricted. 99
Conclusion
Turning again to the hypothetical, 100 suppose that the agency were
to conduct the rulemaking proceeding to regulate television adver-
tising under the proposed restrictions. Because the broadcasters know
that they will not have access to agency decisionmakers after the com-
ment period without good cause, they will make their full arguments
in the public proceeding. This will allow rebuttal by other parties
and ultimately will benefit the agency by permitting a full airing of
by adopting the strategy of § 557(d)(1)(E), see note 20 supra, whereby the prohibition
takes effect from the time the initiating party has knowledge of the agency's intention
to make a rule.
95. See note 21 supra (similar penalty for violations of ban in formal rulemaking).
96. This procedure was followed in a number of cases. See, e.g., Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978); Sangamon
Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 915 (1964).
97. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978); Note, supra note 79, at 1193.
98. There is widespread agreement as to the importance of not overformalizing in-
formal rulemaking. See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 10, at 142; S.260 Hearings, supra note
22, at 251-53 (testimony of Administrative Conference of United States representative).
Adoption of this Note's analysis would not result in the transformation of informal
rulemaking into formal rulemaking. Under the balancing test, the benefits of importing
the other procedural components of formal rulemaking, such as cross-examination, into
informal rulemaking would not outweigh the costs in terms of flexibility and efficiency.
99. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (alternative procedure must be
adopted if benefits outweigh costs).
100. See p. 198 supra.
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the issues. Individual members of Congress who wish to express
their views can do so by submitting written comments. By applying
an objective "good cause" standard, the agency will avoid giving any
party preferential treatment in allowing late submissions. In the event
the agency requires additional information, it can request it from the
parties, but the information must be put in the public record. The
restrictions protect the individual interests in the proceeding and in-
crease the likelihood of "reasoned decisionmaking on the merits."'u0
101. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1978).
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